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POVERTY LAW
UNBORN CHILD DEEMED INELIGIBLE FOR

AFDC

BENEFITS

Wisdom v. Norton
At a time when the legal status of a fetus is in issue," considerable

controversy has been generated over whether the fetus should be classified a "dependent child" under the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program. 2 Addressing this debate, the Second Circuit,
in Wisdom v. Norton,3 has determined that the unborn are not entitled
to AFDC benefits. By so holding, the court has taken a position contrary
to the weight of authority4 and has dramatically crystallized a conflict
destined for resolution by the Supreme Court.5
At the turn of the century, institutionalization was the sole relief
for children whose parents could not support them.6 Subsequently,
the realization that these children would be better protected by remaining with their mothers led to the development of the mothers'
pension movement. 7 Responding to this need, the AFDC program was
established by the Social Security Act of 19358 as a "scheme of cooperative federalism" whereby the federal government matches funds with
1 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973), wherein the Supreme Court stated
that a fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Before
the last trimester of pregnancy, its rights are inseparable from those of its mother. Sre
generally Byrn, Wade and Bolton: FundamentalLegal Errors and Dangerous Implications,
19 CATH. LAW. 243 (1973); Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade
and Its Critics, 53 BOSrON U.L. REv. 765 (1973); Comment, AFDC for the Unborn, 53
NEB. L. REv. 581 (1974).
242 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1970).
3 507 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1974).
4 See note 57 and accompanying text infra.
O See text accompanying note 80 infra.
0 See Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure of the AFDC Program Since 1935, 59
CORNELL L. REv. 825, 826-27 (1974).
7 Id. A conference called by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1909 recommended that
aid be provided to enable needy mothers to remain at home with their children. In
response, various groups began lobbying in the state legislatures for appropriate action.
rhe subsequent adoption of mothers' pension laws by many states was later frustrated,
however, by the unavailability of state funds during the Depression years. The federal
government came to the assistance of the states and the mothers via the Social Security
Act of 1935. Id.
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396g (1970). The Social Security Act states that the purpose of
AFDC is to
encourag[e] the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes
of relatives . . . to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such
parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support
and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection ....
Id. § 601.
9 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
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participating states to assist the parents or relatives of "dependent
children" in providing for their care and maintenance. The state, in
order to qualify for' 0 and retain" federal funding, must administer
the program in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the regulations of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW).
Although the Act does not specifically mention the unborn, it has been
the policy of HEW, since 1946, to allow the states the option of extending benefits on their behalf. 12 In 1971, this policy was elevated to
the status of a formal regulation.'3
In Wisdom, the Second Circuit was confronted with a challenge
to Connecticut's decision, under HEW's option, to refuse to recognize
a fetus' eligibility for AFDC benefits. 14 A mother, pregnant with her
third child and already receiving AFDC aid for two children, was
denied additional assistance for the fetus by Connecticut. Additionally,
two women, requesting admission for the first time to the AFDC program on the basis of their pregnancies, were denied relief. Although
otherwise qualified, they were not admitted for lack of an eligible
"child" under Connecticut's standards. Eventually, a class action was
instituted on behalf of these and similarly situated women seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief to restrain the state from refusing to
grant AFDC benefits for the unborn. The plaintiffs claimed that the
state policy was inconsistent with the Social Security Act and, therefore,
was invalid under the supremacy clause. 15 In addition, they asserted
that the practice denied them equal protection of the laws as payments
were withheld from pregnant mothers but were granted to mothers
whose children were already born.' 6 The district court agreed that the
policy was improper under the terms of the Social Security Act.' 7 The
Second Circuit reversed, however, holding that the granting of AFDC
10 42

U.S.C. § 602 (1970).
l1 Id. § 604.
12 This practice originated in 1941 in a decision to waive audit exceptions as to
payments made in Wisconsin on behalf of the unborn. It became formal policy, apparently, when it was included in the 1946 HEW Handbook. The practice was always considered optional. See Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620, 625 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1973), rev'd,
504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1975)
(No. 74-877).
1345 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(ii) (1973) states:
(2) Federal financial participation is available in:
(ii) Payments with respect to an unborn child when the fact of pregnancy
has been determined by medical diagnosis ....
'4 507 F.2d at 751-52.
15 See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
16 See U. S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
17 Wisdom v. Norton, 372 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Conn. 1974). See note 47 infra.
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benefits for the unborn is not permitted by the Act.' 8 Moreover, since
it had disposed of the issue on statutory grounds, the court refused to
remand plaintiffs' equal protection claim for resolution by a threejudge district court.19
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Weinfeld observed that

the unborn are neither included nor excluded by the express language
of the Act. 20 Rather, a "dependent child" is defined in the Act as
a needy child... who has been deprived of parental support or
care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or
physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with
his [various relatives], in a place of residence maintained by one
or more of such relatives as his or their own home .... 21
A careful consideration of this and various other provisions of the
Act 22 led the court to conclude that "the language ... makes sense only
23
if the term 'child' is limited to those who are born."
Having further determined that the "ordinary meaning" 24 of the
word "child" is one already born, 25 the court looked to the legislative
18 507 F.2d at 755.
10 See notes 47-54 and accompanying text infra.
20 507 F.2d at 753.
2142 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).

22 These additional provisions include 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(7), (8) (the child's income
and resources must be evaluated in determining the amount of benefits); id. § 602(a)(11)
(law enforcement officials must be notified as to benefits furnished a deserted or abandoned child); id. §§ 602(a)(13)-(15) (a plan of social services must be framed to aid the
child and his relatives); id. § 602(a)(16) (the homes of AFDC children must be examined
to insure their suitability); id. § 602(a)(17) (the state must try to determine the paternity
of a child born illegitimately).
23 507 F.2d at 753. The kind of problem that results from including the unborn and
then trying to apply these provisions is illustrated in a recent California Supreme Court
decision invalidating a state regulation which attempted to measure the recipient's "income" in terms of "the comforts he receives in his mother's womb." California Welfare
Rights Organ. v. Brian, 11 Cal. 3d 237, 240, 520 P.2d 970, 972, 113 Cal. Rptr. 154, 156
(1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3295 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1974).
24By considering the ordinary meaning, the court was following a well-established
rule of statutory construction. See Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966); Hanover
Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672, 687 (1962); Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 641
(1954); Commissioner v. Korell, 339 U.S. 619, 627-28 (1950); Crane v. Commissioner, 331
U.S. 1, 6 (1947).
25 The Second Circuit considered relevant the common statement, "I have two children and one on the way." 507 F.2d at 754.
In Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W.
3319 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1974) (No. 74-637), Judge Pell, in a separate opinion, offered similar
arguments. He found it inconceivable that Congress could have "used language so loosely
as to mean that a woman carrying an unborn child but with no living children was a
family with a dependent child ... " id. at 159, or that the fetus could be considered as
living with his mother. Id. He also pointed out that neither the prospective mother nor
the father were considered "parents" until the child was born. Id.
The plaintiffs in Wisdom cited four dictionaries as support for their position that
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history of the Act for guidance. The court was unpersuaded by the
plaintiffs' argument that including "the unborn within the definition
of 'dependent child' furthers the underlying purpose of the Act of
'encouraging the care of dependent children.' "26 Instead, Judge Weinfeld reasoned that, although this might be socially desirable, the role
of the judiciary was not to advance such "legislative policy considerations" but to consider "whether Congress intended to extend the benefits of the Act to an unborn child." 27 The court concluded that the
AFDC program was enacted to provide aid to families existing without
the financial support of a father, thus enabling the mother to care for
the children in the home.28 As prenatal health care provisions existed
elsewhere in the Social Security Act, 29 it was likely that, in enacting the
AFDC program, Congress never contemplated the unborn fetus at all. 0
In reaching its decision, the court recognized that committees of
both Houses8 1 had unsuccessfully urged an amendment to the Social
Security Act which would have specifically excluded the unborn from
AFDC eligibility. 82 Proponents of including the unborn have viewed
the definition of "child" includes the unborn; the defendants listed six dictionaries as
substantiating the opposite view. The court ruled that this "battle of dictionaries" had
ended in a stalemate. 507 F.2d at 753. Accord, Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861, 869 n.17 (5th
Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1975) (No. 74-877).
26 507 F.2d at 754, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970). See Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp.
1343 (N.D. Ohio 1973):

Since the health, both mental and physical, of children is an integral part of

the stability and well-being of family life, it is of some importance to relate the
necessity of prenatal care to that end....
...It has become a medically accepted proposition that low-birthweight/

prenatally-malnourished youth are universally more susceptible to personality

disorders.
... If adequate fetal nutrition can alleviate in any degree potential burdens
upon the State toward the goal of familial betterment, inclusion of the unborn
as eligible for AFDC coverage is indicated by the intent of Congress in implementing the Social Security Act.
Id. at 1346 (citations omitted). See also Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155, 157-58 (7th Cir.
1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1974) (No. 74-637).
27 507 F.2d at 754 (emphasis added). See also Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir.
1974) (Pell, J., concurring & dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S.
Nov. 23, 1974) (No. 74-637), wherein it is stated:
[N]o matter how laudable the motivation or the object to be achieved may be,
the result reached by the majority of the courts passing on the instant question
appears to me so to smack of judicial legislation as to require that laudability of
objective be overridden in the interest of the proper scope of the judicial function.
Id. at 161.
28507 F.2d at 755.

42 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970).
F.2d at 755. But see Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244, 1246 (Ist Cir. 1974), wherein
the court stated that the provisions of the Act relating to prenatal care are irrelevant to
the meaning of the AFDC provisions.
31 S. REP. No. 92-1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 92-231, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 184 (1971).
32 H.R. REP. No. 92-231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 184 (1971) states:
Your committee wants to make clear that an unborn child would not be included
29 See
30 507
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the rejection of this amendment as an acceptance of the fetus' eligibility.33 Opponents, however, contend that the amendment went unenacted merely because Congress decided to refrain from dealing
with the welfare of families at this time. 34 Unable to resolve such hypotheses, the Second Circuit could draw "no clear meaning from the
92nd Congress' failure to enact the proposed amendment, and
[would] ascribe no significance to it."
The court also rejected plaintiffs' contention that Connecticut's
policy of excluding the unborn from AFDC benefits should be invalidated under what has come to be known as the "trilogy rule." 36
Formulated in a series of three Supreme Court decisions,3 7 this rule
directs that
at least in the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its

legislative history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons
eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the
Social Security
Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy
Clause.3 8
in the definition of a child. This will preclude the practice, now used in the
AFDC program in some States, of finding that an unborn child does meet the
definition, thereby establishing a "family" even before the child is born.
Similarly, S. RFP. No. 92-1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1972) provides:
Regulations of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare permit Aid to
Families with Dependent Children payments for a child who has not yet been
born. The committee bill would make unborn children ineligible for AFDC.
As finally enacted, the amendment to the Social Security Act makes no reference to the
unborn. See Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329.
3 See Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244, 1247 (1st Cir. 1974) ("The fact that Congress
thought it necessary to amend the Act to exclude the unborn suggests to us that the Act
as written does make the unborn eligible for AFDC assistance . . . . ); Whitfield v.
Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798, 803 (D. Mass. 1973) (the failure to enact indicates Congress'
wish to retain HEW's flexible policy); Harris v. Mississippi State Dep't of Pub. Welfare,
363 F. Supp. 1293, 1296 (NJD. Miss. 1973), af'd, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974) (if Congress
would not exclude the unborn, a state cannot without violating the Act); Wilson v.
Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147, 1154-55 (N.D. Ill. 1972), af'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S.
Nov. 23, 1974) (No. 74-637) (Congress indicated that the unborn are receiving benefits
under present provisions and that the Act would have to be amended to change this
practice).
84"mhe reason the legislation was not passed was because the Congress decided to
deal only with the Adult Categories of Public Assistance .......
Mixon v. Keller, 372
F. Supp. 51, 55 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3203 (U.S.
Oct. 15, 1974). See Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329.
35 507 F.2d at 757. Cf. Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343, 1344 (N.D. Ohio 1973);
Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620, 624-25 (N.D. Ga. 1973), rev'd, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir.
1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1975) (No. 74-877) (expression
of the view that these unenacted proposals merely indicate Congress' awareness that optional payments are being made to the unborn).
30 507 F.2d at 755-56.
37 See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282
(1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
as 507 F.2d at 755-56, quoting Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971).
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As the unborn are nowhere expressly excluded by the Social Security
Act, some courts have relied upon the "trilogy rule" as authority mandating inclusion. 39 The Second Circuit, however, noted that the Supreme Court in New York Department of Social Services v. Dublino4°
indicated that the rule is applicable only "to those cases where 'it [is]
clear that state law exclude[s] people from AFDC benefits who the
Social Security Act expressly provided would be eligible.' "41 Since the
Act did not expressly provide for the fetus, the court declined to rec42
ognize the applicability of the trilogy rule to Wisdom.
Significantly, the court further determined that HEW had exceeded its statutory authority in granting states the option to extend
AFDC benefits for the unborn. 43 In the court's view, eligibility for
AFDC benefits must be determined solely by reference to the Social
Security Act.44 If the unborn are eligible, the "trilogy rule" dictates
that HEW has no authority to allow states the option of withholding
payments.45 By the same token, if they are ineligible under the Act,
HEW has no authority to approve the extension of payments. 40
39 See note 68 infra. For an expanded analysis of the trilogy rule and its effect, see
text accompanying notes 60-69 infra.
40413 U.S. 405 (1973).
41 507 F.2d at 756, quoting New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,
421 (1973) (emphasis added).
42 See also Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155, 161 (7th Cir. 1974) (Pell, J., concurring &
dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1974) (No. 74-637).
43 507 F.2d at 756.
44 For a more detailed consideration of basic eligibility as the threshold issue, see
text accompanying notes 66-69 infra.
45 See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282
(1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
46 507 F.2d at 756. But see cases cited in note 56 infra.
The Second Circuit was not influenced by HEW's role as administrator of the Social
Security Act. While it acknowledged that "the construction of a statute by the agency
charged with administering it is entitled to be given weight," the Second Circuit felt it
was the court's duty in the last analysis to interpret a statute. 507 F.2d at 756. But see
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), where the Supreme Court stated:
ohe construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be
owed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong, especially when
Congress has refused to alter the administrative construction.
Id. at 381 (footnotes omitted).
Judge Weinfeld noted that HEW had conceded that a fetus is not within the definition of "dependent child" set forth in the Act. 507 F.2d at 757. See also Wilson v. Weaver,
358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 499 F.2d
155 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1974) (No.
74-637), where the court observed:
HEW contends that unlike the terms "parent" in King v. Smith . . . and "continued absence from the home" in Carleson v. Remillard ... the meaning of the
term "dependent child" . . . is unclear, that it cannot unequivocally be said to
include unborn children, and that it therefore should not be so construed.
358 F. Supp. at 1153. Judge Weinfeld concluded that, rather than an expression of official
statutory construction, HEW's policy is merely "an exercise of administrative discretion
authorized by the Secretary's broad rule-making authority.
507 F.2d at 757. But see
Carver v. Hooker, 501 F2d 1244, 1247 (1st Cir. 1974).
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Having disposed of the plaintiffs' statutory claims, the court refused
to remand the case to a three-judge district court for consideration of
the plaintiffs' constitutional objection.4 7 Although it admitted that a
colorable claim was raised,48 the court reasoned that a remand would
serve no purpose since the district court, "bound as it would be by our
determination of the statutory issue, would have to deny the equal protection claim."49
In reaching this conclusion, the court appears to have adopted a
view which is inconsistent with both the Supreme Court's direction in
Hagans v. Lavine"0 and the procedure followed recently by another
Second Circuit panel in Taylor v. Lavine.51 The Hagans Court directed
that "if a single judge rejects the statutory claim, a three-judge court
must be called to consider the constitutional issue."5 2 Accordingly, since
the Wisdom court rejected the statutory claim, a three-judge district
court should have been convened to consider the plaintiffs' constitutional claim. In Taylor, the Second Circuit reversed two district court
findings that certain New York AFDC regulations were offensive to
the Social Security Act. However, the court remanded the case to a
three-judge district court to consider the plaintiffs' claim that the reg47 507 F.2d at 758. The plaintiffs had originally requested that a three-judge district
court be convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). The district judge first determined
that the plaintiffs' constitutional claim was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction. Then,
under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, he struck down the state policy on the statutory, i.e., supremacy clause, argument raised by the plaintiffs. Thus, there existed no need
to address the plaintiffs' constitutional claim. 372 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Conn. 1974). This
procedure was approved by the Supreme Court in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
48 507 F.2d at 757-58. The court assumed, without deciding, that a mother has standing
in her own right to raise the issue. Id. at 758. The Fifth Circuit, attacking the question
directly, held that the mother had standing. Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974),
petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1975) (No. 74-877). Since the purpose of the program is to provide "money payments with respect to . . . a dependent
child ... to meet the needs of the relative with whom any dependent child is living,"
42 US.C. § 606(b)(1) (1970), the court reasoned that the mother's rights are direct, not
derivative. 504 F.2d at 865. This stance avoids conflict with the Supreme Court's decision
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that a fetus is not a "person" in terms of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 158. See note I supra. Contra, Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp.
1379 (N.D. Fla. 1974), wherein the court held that Roe's holding foreclosed plaintiffs'
allegation of denial of equal protection:
[IThe unborn child and persons acting in behalf of an unborn child may not assert the deprivation of any rights or privileges secured by the Amendment.
Id. at 1383 (citations omitted).
49 507 F.2d at 758 (footnotes omitted).
50 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
51497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 US.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1974)

(No. 74-5054).
52 415 US. at 544. Cf. Murrow v. Clifford, 502 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1974), wherein it
was held
improper for a single district court judge to decide a supremacy clause claim
against the claimant when it is pendent to a constitutional claim which must
he decided by a three-judge district court.
Id. at 1070.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:383

ulations denied them due process of law. 53 Despite these apparent inconsistencies, however, the Wisdom court was perhaps justified in failing
to convene the three-judge district court since it accurately predicted
that the question of whether the unborn are entitled to AFDC benefits
would soon be entertained by the Supreme Court.5
By holding not only that the unborn are ineligible for AFDC
benefits under the Social Security Act but also that HEW does not have
the authority to provide for their optional inclusion, the Second Circuit stands alone.6 Although three district courts have agreed that
benefits for the unborn were not intended by Congress, they have
upheld HEW's option plan.56 Moreover, five courts of appeals and ten
district courts, while agreeing that HEW's option policy is incorrect,
have concluded that the unborn are entitled to benefits and that no
state may exclude them. 57
53 The three-judge district court, in turn, declared the regulations unconstitutional
as violative of due process. Hurley v. Van Lare, 43 U.S.L.W. 2080 (U.S. Aug. 27, 1974),
prob. juris. noted, 43 U.SXL.W. 3330 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1974) (No. 74-453).
54 The Court has granted certiorari in Alcala v. Burns, 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3187 (US. Oct. 15, 1974) (No. 73-1708).
Although the Wisdom court considered it unnecessary to remand the case to a threejudge district court, it gratuitously offered its opinion that the denial of AFDC benefits
to the unborn is constitutional:
Appellees do not allege that it is invidiously discriminatory in a constitutional

sense, and the classification is a rational means of advancing the purpose of the
AFDC program: encouraging the presence of a relative in the home of a dependent child to supervise the child's upbringing.

507 F.2d at 759. See also Doe v. Lukhard, 493 F.2d 54, 57 (4th Cir. 1974), petition for cert.
filed, 43 U.S..W. 3075 (U.S. Aug. 18, 1974) (No. 73-1763) (court "doubted" that a "color-

able" claim of denial of equal protection "would prove to be meritorious'). But see
Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798 (D. Mass. 1973):
IT]his Court believes if the department of public welfare's denial for AFDC applications to the plaintiff rests solely because their children had not yet been
born and granted the application to other women whose children had been born,

then it very well could violate plaintiffs' rights to equal protection of the laws.

Id. at 804.
55 The Mixon court, while adverting to HEW as having "overstepped itself," denied
relief without definitively striking down the optional plan. See Mixon v. Keller, 372
F. Supp. 51, 54-55 (M.D. Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3203 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974).
56 Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Fla. 1974); Murrow v. Clifford, Civil No.
114-73 (D.N.J., June 12, 1973), vacated and remanded, 502 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1974); Parks
v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973), rev'd, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974), petition
for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1975) (No. 74-877).
57 Harris v. Mississippi, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974), af'g 363 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D.
Miss. 1973); Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244 (Ist Cir. 1974), af'g 369 F. Supp. 204 (D.N.H.
1973); Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), af'g in part, rev'g in part on other
grounds, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973) and Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123 (N.D.
Ind. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1974) (No. 74-637);
Alcala v. Bums, 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974), af'g 362 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa 1973),
cert. granted, 43 US.L.W. 3187 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974) (No. 73-1708); Doe v. Lukhard, 493
F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974), af'g 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 43
US.L.W. 3075 (U.S. Aug. 18, 1974) (No. 73-1763); Wisdom v. Norton, 372 F. Supp. 1190
(D. Conn. 1974); Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798 (D. Mass. 1973); Stuart v. Canary,
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The existing controversy results primarily from Congress' failure to
reveal a clear intent 5s and HEW's refusal to take a positive stance.5 9
Also clouding the issue, however, is the meaning to be attributed to the
"trilogy rule" relied upon by the Wisdom plaintiffs. The "trilogy rule"
is the product of the Supreme Court decisions in King v. Smith, 60
Carleson v. Remillard,61 and Townsend v. Swank.62 In King, the Court
rejected Alabama's "substitute father" regulation wherein payments
were denied to children if their mother "cohabited" with an ablebodied man. In determining the meaning of "parent" in terms of
the definition of a "dependent child" as one "deprived of parental
support," 63 the Court looked to the language of the Act and its purpose.
In Carleson, the Court invalidated a California regulation holding ineligible a "dependent child" whose parent's "continued absence from
the home" 64 was the result of military service. The Court defined "con-

tinued absence" as including absence of a parent for any reason whatever. In Townsend, the Court refused to allow Illinois to exclude
college students, between 18 and 20 years of age, from benefits allowed
to children within that age group attending high school or vocational
training school. It determined that such a distinction was not supported
by the Act. 5
From these decisions has evolved the rule that a state eligibility
criterion serving to exclude those eligible by federal standards is invalid in the absence of clear congressional authorization.6" Some courts
367 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Jones v. Graham, Civil No. 73-L-235 (D. Neb., Sept. 5,
1978).
[8 Most courts have agreed that ambiguity exists as to whether the term "dependent
child" within the Social Security Act was intended to include an unborn child. See, e.g.,
Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244, 1246 (1st Cir. 1974); Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155, 157
(7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1974) (No. 74-637).
59 See Parks v. Harden, 854 F. Supp. 620 (N.D.Ga. 1973), rev'd, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir.
1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 8417 (US. Jan. 17, 1975) (No. 74-877):
Distressingly, [this is] yet another instance in which the federal agency involved, HEW, has failed to utilize its powers to resolve such issues in the first
instance with national uniformity.
354 F. Supp. at 622 (citations omitted). Cf. Developments in Welfare Law-1973, 59 CORNELL
L. REv. 859, 872 n.87 (1974).
60 392 U.S. 809 (1968).
61406 U.S. 598 (1972).
62404 U.S. 282 (1971).
63 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
64 Id.
65 This distinction is not made in 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(2)(B) (1970), which provides:
When used in this part(a) The term "dependent child" means a needy child . . . (2) who is . . . (B)
under the age of twenty-one and (as determined by the State in accordance with
standards prescribed by the Secretary) a student regularly attending a school, college, or university, or regularly attending a course of vocational or technical
training designed to fit him for gainful employment ....
66 Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971).
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have interpreted this dictate as mandating inclusion when there is no
specific exclusion.67 More significantly, however, in terms of the unborn, the rule has led courts to provide coverage without meeting the
threshold question, addressed by the Second Circuit, of statutory eligibility."' In effect, after the AFDC claimant has made a showing of the
reasonableness of inclusion, this more liberal interpretation shifts the
burden to the state to show Congress' explicit intent to exclude the
unborn. 69 It is fairly evident, therefore, that the varying interpretations

emanating from the trilogy rule serve only to further confound the
issue of the unborn child's right to AFDC benefits.
Adding to the confusion surrounding the unborn's rights are
various Supreme Court decisions which appear to allow the states some
discretion in fixing eligibility standards. In Wyman v. James,70 the
Court permitted a "home visit" condition for eligibility not authorized
by the Act. Jefferson v. Hackney7 1 resulted in Court approval of a percentage factor used to reduce a family's level of need in order to allocate
Texas' limited available funds. A maximum grant provision in Maryland, which also served to reduce benefits to larger families, was similarly approved in Dandridge v. Williams.72 However, the issues in
these cases, viz., the management of funds by the state, should not be
confused with the determination of eligibility under the AFDC program. 7 3 Due to the nature of the program's funding, the states have
74
always had "considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources,"
each state "set[ting] its own standard of need and .. .determin[ing]
67 See cases cited in note 68 infra.
68 See, e.g., Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974); Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp.
1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir.
1147 (N.D. Ill.
1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1974) (No. 74-637). The
Fifth Circuit, while purporting to consider basic eligibility first, used the trilogy rule as
an "aid to . . . statutory reading." Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861, 868 (5th Cir. 1974),
petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1975) (No. 74877).
69 See Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Doe v. Luklhard,
363 F. Supp. 823, 827 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974), petition for cert.
filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. Aug. 18, 1974) (No. 73-1763); Developments in Welfare Law1973, 59 CoRN.mL L. REv. 859, 868 n.63 (1974).
70400 U.S. 309 (1971).
71 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
72397 U.S. 471 (1970).
78 See Developments in Welfare Law-1973, 59 CoF.L L. Ray. 859, 869 n.69 (1974).
Actually, eligibility is determined by the Act, even as to those portions of the AFDC
program in which state participation is truly optional. For example, section 406(a)(2)(B)
of the Social Security Act expressly allows states the option to extend AFDC benefits to
children under 21 years of age who are continuing their education. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(2)(B)
(1970). However, a state which has elected to participate in the age group extension program by expending funds therein may not withhold benefits from a student who is
eligible under the federal criteria. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 288 (1971).
74 King v. Smith, 892 U.S. 309, 318 (1968).

1975]

SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1973 TERM

the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the program."75
This latitude explains both Jefferson and Dandridge.Wyman's "home
visit" condition presents more of a problem, although it can be considered an administrative means whereby the state verifies eligibility
76
criteria.
Apparently, a number of courts, as well as HEW, have viewed
the inclusion or exclusion of the unborn as a means, similar to those
presented in Jefferson and Dandridge,whereby the states can elect to
disburse more or less in the way of benefits.7 7 However, if a state cannot
use "the device of adopting eligibility requirements restricting the
class of children made eligible by federal standards,"78 it should not
have the option of extending the class of those federally eligible. As
the Second Circuit pointed out in Wisdom, basic eligibility under the
Act is "either mandatory or it is not . . .,79
Fortunately, final judicial resolution in this area should be forthcoming. The Supreme Court has granted review of the Eighth Circuit's
holding in Alcala v. Burnss0 which entitled unborns to AFDC benefits
under the Social Security Act.* It is submitted that the Court should
resolve the issue through statutory interpretation, making clear that the
"trilogy rule" is applicable only after an initial determination of
eligibility has been made. As properly noted by the Second Circuit, the
language of the AFDC provisions of the Social Security Act appears
to refer only to children already born. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that satisfactory prenatal care should result in a healthier, happier child. Indeed, benefitting children is the purpose of AFDC. 81
75 Id. at 318-19 (footnotes and citations omitted).
76 See Wyman v. James, 400 US. 309, 322, 326 (1971).
77 When HEW held similarly as to the absence of a parent because of military service,

the Carleson Court disagreed. Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 604 (1972). The applicable HEW regulation provides:
Continued absence of the parent from the home constitutes the reason for deprivation of parental support or care when the parent is out of the home, the
nature of the absence is such as either to interrupt or to terminate the parent's
functioning as a provider of maintenance, physical care, or guidance for the child,
and the known or indefinite duration of the absence precludes counting on the
parent's performance of his function in planning for the present support or care
of the child. If these conditions exist, the parent may be absent for any reason,
and he may have left only recently or some time previously.
45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(1)(iil) (1973). While HEW interpreted "continued absence" as including that due to military service, it allowed the states the option of either covering such
situations or not. See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 602 (1972).
78 Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 291 (1971).
79 507 F.2d at 756. Accord, Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861, 872 (5th Cir. 1974), petition
for cert. filed, 43 US.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1975) (No. 74-877) (holding the unborn
eligible).
80494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 US.L.W. 3187 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974)
(No. 73-1708).
* See Editor's Note, overleaf.
81 See note 8 supra. Since pregnant women are frequently unable to work, the unborn
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However, in the final analysis, the issue is not whether care should be
provided for the unborn but whether the AFDC program was in82
tended to perform this function.
Marsha A. Hakim
may be considered in greater need for financial aid than those children already born.
See Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155, 158 n.4 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43
US.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1974) (No. 74-637); Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620, 622
(N.D. Ga. 1973), rev'd, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W.
3417 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1975) (No. 74-877).
82 Various cases have pointed out that there are other programs specifically designed
for prenatal care. See Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (N.D. Fla. 1974) (Florida
provides Medicaid benefits for medical expenses incurred during the last trimester of
pregnancy); Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798, 804 (D. Mass. 1973) (pregnant women
over 18 can apply for general relief assistance from the state). The Second Circuit itself
referred to Title V of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970), which deals
with prenatal care. 507 F.2d at 755.

Editor's Note. While this article was being printed, the Supreme Court reversed
Alcala v. Burns, holding that the term "dependent child," as used in the Social Security
Act, does not include unborn children. 43 U.S.L.W. 4374 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1975). The Court
explained that the triology rule is inapplicable until an initial determination of eligibility
has been made. The Court rendered no opinion as to whether HEW has the authority
to allow states the option to extend AFDC benefits to the unborn.

